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It is easy to agree that the European Union has failed to respond adequately to the massive 
inflow of refugees and other migrants in 2015. But critiques focus on different aspects. One clear 
indicator for failure is the death toll in the Mediterranean Sea that has never been as high as in 
2016. According to the Missing Migrants Database, the estimated number of migrants arriving 
by sea in the first eleven months of 2016 declined by 60% compared to the same period in 2015, 
whereas the number of deaths rose by 32% to 4699.1 This is mainly due to the shift of the main 
migration route from the less dangerous one via Turkey to Greek islands to the more often lethal 
Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy. Another major failure is most strongly 
symbolized by the building of fences and the re-introduction of systematic border controls at 
previously open internal Schengen borders. 27 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the project 
of a seamless area of open borders and free movement is again in jeopardy. For a third group of 
critics, both of these failures are merely the result of a misguided humanitarian policy. A third 
critique, which has come to dominate public discourses, focuses instead on the loss of 
sovereignty experienced by member states during the crisis. In this view, extending the rescue at 
sea missions towards the North African coast in spring 2015 and waiving refugees through to 
Germany and Sweden in the summer of that year sent the wrong signal by prompting people to 
claim asylum in Europe who might otherwise have stayed in their home countries or 
neighbouring states.  
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The disagreement among these different perspectives is not about facts; it is not even 
about empirical hypotheses on push and pull factors driving the current mass migration. The 
disagreement is fundamentally about values.  How strong should Europe’s commitment be to 
rescue migrants at sea, to admit asylum seekers and to distribute the burdens of refugee 
admission fairly among member states? And what are morally acceptable limits to these 
commitments? My argument in this intervention will be unashamedly based on moral premises, 
because I am convinced that these lie at the heart of the controversies. The normative question of 
what responsible agents ought to do in a humanitarian crisis must always take into account what 
they are able to do, but this is different from asking the empirical question of what they are likely 
to do based on their interests. Those who defend the deterrence of refugees or the closure of 
Europe’s internal borders on realist grounds of state interests and domestic political necessities 
engage in flawed normative thinking.  
 
THREE DUTIES OF STATES TO ADMIT INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS 
 
So what are the duties of liberal democratic states in immigrant and refugee admission policies? 
Some liberal political theorists and political economists question whether states ought to have a 
right to immigration control in the first place (Carens 1987, Kukathas 2005, Moses 2006). Open 
borders arguments can be based on global social justice. Why should those who had the good 
fortune to be born in wealthy democracies have a moral right to shut out the less fortunate 
citizens of poor states? They can also be based on the value of freedom and individual choice. 
Why should individuals be free to leave any state or move their residence within a state territory 
but be subjected to state control when they want to take up residence in another state?2 Finally, 
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economists point out that open borders would lead to a globally more efficient allocation of 
labour and an equalization of wage differentials (Simon 1989, Milanovic 2016) . These 
arguments can be contested on various grounds, but all I want to claim here is that they fail to 
take into account to whom they are addressed. Liberal democratic states are not mere instruments 
for promoting global justice, freedom and economic efficiency. As members of the international 
society of states their external legitimacy depends, on the one hand, on their respect for universal 
human rights, which form the moral backbone of international law. Their internal legitimacy  as 
liberal democratic states, on the other hand, depends on promoting the freedom and well-being of 
their residents and on their accountability to their citizens. Such states cannot be obliged to open 
their borders indiscriminately for immigration if doing so would jeopardize their internal 
legitimacy.  
They can, however, be expected to open them selectively for three reasons. First, 
promoting the freedom and well-being of their own citizens implies not only that liberal states 
must let these emigrate or return from abroad, but also that they ought to promote their 
opportunities to enter other states and take up residence there. Liberal states issue passports for 
their citizens and negotiate visa waiver conditions for short-term visits abroad. Why should they 
not also enter broader reciprocity-based agreements on free movement with other states and fully 
open their border with neighbouring states if these are willing to coordinate their external border 
controls and immigration policies with them (Bauböck 2011)? This is precisely what the member 
states of the EU and the Schengen countries have done. Their commitment to free movement for 
EU citizens and open internal borders has strengthened their internal legitimacy as liberal 
democracies because it has greatly enhanced the freedom and well-being of their own citizens 
and residents. But these reasons for open borders and free movement are not universal ones. 
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They apply between states that are sufficiently similar in terms of their liberal democratic 
constitutions and levels of social protection. Liberal democracies cannot be obliged to fully open 
their borders or unconditionally admit immigrants if they cannot jointly govern the area of free 
movement with the other states involved or if the result would be a serious decline in levels of 
social protection for their own residents. This first set of reasons starts from internal legitimacy 
concerns but the policies resulting from it generate an external duty of sincere cooperation with 
other states involved in reciprocal agreements on free movement and joint governance of an area 
of open borders. 
There is, however, a second set of reasons for admitting immigrants from third countries, 
with whom reciprocity-based agreements and joint governance are not possible if there is an 
expected ‘triple win’ for the country of immigration, the individual migrant and the country of 
origin. This reason supports economic immigration programmes rather than open borders. 
Numbers will be limited and immigrants will have to apply and be selected according to their 
expected contributions. Since immigrants ought to benefit also themselves, well-designed and 
justifiable programmes must include protection against exploitation and discrimination and 
proactive integration policies. And in order to make sure that countries of origin benefit as well, 
destination states ought to facilitate the return flow of remittances and refrain from poaching 
locally scarce skills (e.g. of medical nurses and doctors) or compensate origin countries for the 
brain drain they suffer. These reasons start again from liberal democracies’ self-interests but 
extend their external duties further by including now special concerns for the freedom and well-
being of foreign nationals selected for immigration as well as for the development of their 
countries of origin. 
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The third type of admission duties of liberal democracies are derived from universal 
human rights. They concern, on the one hand, family reunification and, on the other hand, 
asylum seekers and refugees. A duty to admit close family members of immigrants is based on a 
human right to private and family life, but it is also supported by the particularistic commitment 
of liberal democracies to the well-being of all their residents, including foreign ones whom they 
have previously admitted as economic migrants or refugees. For refugees the problem is a harder 
one. When holding their government accountable for its refugee policies, the citizens of 
democratic states can ask two questions: ‘Why should other states be responsible for the failure 
of some governments to protect their citizens’ from persecution and violence?’ ‘And why should 
our state rather than any other one be responsible for taking in a particular refugee?’   
Some scholars have suggested that it is easier to convince liberal states and their citizens 
to admit refugees if these questions are defused by conceiving of refugee protection as a 
humanitarian duty that cannot be legally enforced and that is limited by the costs incurred by 
those who are ready to help.3 Yet this view falls behind the legal entrenchment of a right to 
asylum and a duty of non-refoulement in international law since World War II. The answer to the 
first question should therefore be as follows. The territorial sovereignty of states and the 
institution of national citizenship assign to states a specific responsibility for residents in their 
territory and for their citizens wherever these live. Peaceful and friendly relations between states 
based on a norm of non-intervention require that states mutually recognize these assignments of 
territories and populations. But the moral legitimacy of states depends on their capacity and 
willingness to protect the human rights of their citizens and those who reside in their territory. If 
some states fail in this task, this erodes the justification for assigning them special 
responsibilities and creates a general responsibility for other states to restore the broken link 
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connecting citizens to their state. Other states acquire then a responsibility to protect refugees ‘in 
loco civitatis’ (Owen 2016) if their basic human rights are no longer protected by their own 
states. The threshold for legitimate humanitarian intervention by other states must be kept high in 
order to prevent counter-productive as well as self-interested incursions into territorial 
sovereignty. However, the protection of those who have left their country of origin because it has 
failed to protect their human rights, does not require such interventions. Refugee admission by 
other states is therefore not only a humanitarian duty, but a ‘legitimacy repair mechanism’ in the 
international system of states (ibid.). 
There are several possible answers to the second question (‘why our state rather than any 
other?’). One is that our state has been somehow involved in the origin of a refugee crisis. This 
argument supported special duties of the US and France to take in large numbers of boat people 
after the end of the Indochinese wars in the 1970s. Another reason for resettlement has been that 
states such as Canada or Australia see refugees as potential immigrants whom they select 
according to their skills and integration potential. A third answer is that our state happens to be 
close by and is the first safe territory that refugees can reach. This reason is fleshed out most 
strongly in the Geneva Refugee Convention’s individual right to asylum and the customary 
international law duty of non-refoulement of persons to territories where their life or liberty 
would be in danger. Even taken together these three reasons clearly will not secure effective 
protection for a maximum number of refugees since many will lack the special connections or 
skills that create a readiness to admit them in far-away countries as well as the resources needed 
to reach the closest safe country of asylum. Moreover, if it is impossible to create safe havens in 
or close to the refugees’ countries of origin and if not enough refugees are resettled from there, 
then democratic states in the proximity of massive refugee crises will quickly feel overburdened 
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by their duty to admit asylum seekers. The ‘legitimacy repair mechanism’ (Owen 2016) of 
international refugee law is therefore incomplete in the absence of a more general duty of states 
to share the burdens of refugee protection.  
 
BURDEN SHARING IN REFUGEE ADMISSION 
 
Such a duty of burden sharing cannot be met by simply distributing refugees across states in 
relation to their capacity as measured by size of territory, population or GDP. The rationale is 
after all the effective protection of a maximum number of refugees and the question is 
thus:Which redistribution will achieve this goal best? This means that burden sharing can also 
involve redistributing costs rather than refugees, since effective protection can hardly be 
achieved by sending refugees to states where they are unwilling to go and that are unwilling to 
have them.  
In 1997 Yale law professor Peter Schuck proposed a scheme of tradeable refugee 
admission quota (Schuck 1997). Economists have recently suggested optimizing the 
redistribution of refugees and costs through matching states’ preferences for certain refugees and 
refugees’ preferences for certain destinations. In this scheme an equilibrium price would 
determine the amount of financial transfers from states that are reluctant to admit refugees to 
those states that are ready to take in more (Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport 2014). 
Objections have been raised that such schemes would ‘commodify refugees’ (Anker, Fitzpatrick, 
and Shacknove 1998, Sandel 2012). But these seem to be misplaced concerns if the purpose and 
effect is to make states pay for their unwillingness to host refugees. As long as discriminatory 
preferences (to keep out certain refugees on the basis of their skin colour or religion) can be 
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ruled out, such a model would approximate the goal of providing effective protection and 
integration options to the largest feasible number of refugees far better than the current system of 
spontaneous asylum and refugee resettlement.   
How can states’ general duties to cooperate in international burden sharing with regard to 
refugee protection be reconciled with the other two migration policy commitments of liberal 
democracies that I have identified above? Does the prior commitment of EU member states to 
open their territories for free movement of EU citizens exempt them from duties of burden 
sharing in refugee admission? Can states that have a generous policy of admitting economic 
immigrants from less developed countries argue that they do not have to top up their immigration 
quota with refugees?  
The answer to both questions must be ‘no’ for two independent reasons.  
First, if refugee protection is a matter of human rights and state legitimacy, then such duties 
arguably trump the self-interested reasons states have to promote free movement opportunities 
for their own citizens and to develop their own economies through immigration. With regard to 
economic immigration many states decide annual immigration ceilings or quota for specific 
categories. This is not only legitimate but also necessary in order to plan for the investments 
liberal states need to make for integration policies. By contrast, in an international burden 
sharing scheme, states may decide to pay other states to take in some of their refugee quota, but 
the scheme cannot be fair if each participating state can decide autonomously whether and how 
much it is willing to contribute. 
Second, the questions rely on a false empirical premise that I suggest to call the ‘fallacy 
of fixed integration capacities’. It assumes that there is a specifiable numerical limit to how many 
immigrants states can absorb (often expressed in percent of the resident population) so that EU 
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free movers crowd out third country economic immigrants and the latter crowd out refugees. The 
same idea underlies the notion that less densely populated states have greater capacities to admit 
immigrants (Walzer 1983: 42-48). Yet immigrants of all kinds – including refugees – integrate 
most easily in highly urbanized societies where previous immigration has transformed labour 
markets to create additional jobs for new immigrants and where educational or health care 
services have adjusted to culturally diverse populations. This does not mean that there are no 
criteria for determining limits of state capacities to integrate refugees. Current unemployment 
rates and prior intake of refugees in the immediately preceding period are plausible indicators.4 
If all states that do not themselves generate refugees – or even if only all liberal 
democratic states – were willing to participate in an international cooperative scheme that 
balances the above considerations in a fair way, then the burdens of refugee protection would be 
rather small for each state. Countries in the vicinity of refugee crises would still have to initially 
admit many more than others but they would be compensated for this extra burden by 
proportionate transfers of resources. And refugees who need permanent integration and a new 
citizenship rather than temporary protection until they can return to their countries of origin 
would be relocated across countries in a way that takes into account their own preferences and 
interests as well as those of states. 
In the international arena, the problem is of course that such a rational and fair scheme is 
impossible to implement in the absence of incentives and enforcement mechanisms. One can 
argue that, as a matter of justice and legitimacy, states should be ready to cooperate much more 
extensively, but as long as moral blame is the only consequence of non-cooperation most states 
are ready to pay this price rather than their fair contributions to a cooperative solution. The result 
is that the only feasible form of burden sharing remains a ‘coalition of the willing’ whose 
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members decide individually – maybe after some mediation by the UNHCR – which and how 
many refugees they are ready to resettle.  
Does this lack of institutional preconditions for burden sharing mean that each state is 
morally justified in shirking its hypothetical duties under a fair cooperative solution? This is 
what the standard political rhetoric suggests. ‘We would be willing to do our part if all other 
states did theirs. But we know that they won’t and you cannot expect us to take in all the 
refugees of the world.’  This argument is hypocritical since other states’ unwillingness to 
cooperate is invoked as a pre-emptive justification for one’s own. In the international arena, no 
state has a duty to take in alone all refugees, but each liberal democratic state has a robust duty to 
build a coalition of states that are ready to cooperate in refugee admissions and to contribute its 
fair share within such a coalition. 
 
THE PROBLEM-SOLVING CAPACITY AND FAILURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Consider now how the European Union provides a context for refugee admission that is different 
from the international arena. The latter is populated not only by states but by international 
organisations through which states pursue specific goals and try to resolve some of their 
collective action problems. Some of these organisations, such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration address specifically 
refugee and migration policies. Yet the modus operandi of these organisations is to seek state 
consensus on norms and permissive mandates that allow the organisations to carry out 
operational missions.  
 11 
 
The EU provides a very different institutional environment. First, the Treaties give its 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions a broad mandate to generate and enforce legally 
binding norms that take supremacy over national law and have direct effect on the member states 
and their citizens. Moreover, its primary law explicitly invokes a principle of sincere cooperation 
with regard to the tasks spelled out in the Treaty on European Union  (TEU Art. 4.3) and a 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities, including its financial implications, 
between the Member States in matters of border checks, asylum and immigration (TFEU Art. 
80). The EU can also claim much stronger democratic input legitimacy for the common policies 
that it adopts through dual representation of member states in the Council and of citizens in the 
European Parliament and co-legislation powers of these two bodies. Finally, the EU wields a 
much broader repertoire of incentives and sanctions in order to induce member state compliance 
with such policies, ranging from cross-policy linkages, such as with negotiations about the next 
rounds of subsidies, to infringement procedures and court injunctions.  
Second, in the Schengen area the logic of the international system of asylum changes in 
fundamental ways. Refugees arriving on Greek or Italian coasts do not only enter a national but 
also a wider European territory that is structured as a space with open internal borders and joint 
external border control. It is therefore quite natural to assume that all states that have built this 
space also have joint responsibilities for asylum seekers arriving there. The EU institutions 
understood this dynamic already before the current crisis when they introduced three directives 
that aim at harmonizing the criteria for awarding refugee status, the asylum determination 
procedures and the conditions for reception of asylum seekers.5 Member states’ interpretations of 
these standards, however, still vary significantly. The EU average recognition rate of Syrian 
refugees in 2014 was 95%, but dropped to 50% in Estonia and 43% in Slovakia.6 The 
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Commission has therefore recently proposed to replace the asylum qualification and procedures 
directives with regulations.7  
The difference between the international and European contexts is thus that there should 
be no need to build an ad hoc coalition of the willing to resolve the burden sharing dilemma. 
There is already a permanent coalition of member states who have committed to sincere 
cooperation and have created the political institutions and policy instruments for an effective 
system of burden sharing. 
All the more sobering is the failure of the member states to live up to their human rights 
duties towards the refugees and their duties of solidarity towards each other. As of 5 May 2017, 
out of 160.000 refugees to be relocated within the EU, member states have pledged less than 
29,000 places and 18,000 have been actually relocated.8  
Nothing can justify this failure but what may explain it? Apologists will point to the 
special features of the refugee flows: the massive rise in numbers in 2015, the mixed motives and 
composition of flows that include many migrants without claim to refugee status, and the 
prevalence of security concerns because of the strong involvement of criminal smugglers and the 
potential presence of jihadist terrorists. I find it difficult to understand how any of these concerns 
could justify policies of deterring legitimate asylum seekers and defecting from cooperation with 
other member states in the admission and relocation of refugees. On the contrary, all of these 
concerns reinforce the case for cooperation and as long as member states do not renege their 
duties under international refugee law, this cooperation must focus not only on combatting 
organised crime and terrorism but also on providing effective protection for the large number of 
genuine refugees. 
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The second and in my view most important structural reason is the late, contradictory and 
incomplete Europeanization of asylum and migration policies (Noll 2015). While the Schengen 
principles provide the strongest reason for cooperation between EU states, the Dublin Regulation 
has entrenched the very principle that prevents it by shifting the whole burden to the first state of 
entry in the EU. Court decisions in Strasbourg9 and Luxembourg10 have blocked the return of 
asylum seekers to Italy, Greece and Croatia, but the Dublin principles still provide states that 
reject cooperation with a perfect excuse. Reforming Dublin is now on the agenda, but the 
moment when this could have been a game changing move was in the summer of 2015 when the 
Dublin and Schengen principles clashed with each other head on. Schengen implied that asylum 
seekers could move to their preferred destinations further north while Dublin meant that these 
countries had the right to send them back to Greece. In this confrontation, member states had to 
choose between a cooperative solution that would have preserved open borders and distributed 
the refugee admission burden and a non-cooperative one where each country would retake 
control over its national borders. At this point the fixed coalition set of EU and Schengen 
member states that would otherwise have facilitated effective burden sharing turned into a trap. 
Defection by a few states was enough to create a domino effect that tipped the balance towards 
non-cooperation.  
The third reason is the rise of nationalist populism in Europe. The uncontrolled refugee 
movements of summer 2015 triggered an outpouring of spontaneous support in civil society that 
in Germany became known as Willkommenskultur. But it also nourished deep anxieties among 
large sectors of the population about a further loss of control of nation-states through European 
integration, which fed into the ongoing rise of populist parties. Where these have grasped 
political power, as they have in Hungary and Poland, they were able to pull the trigger for the 
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tumbling of dominos. And centrist governments in Western and Northern European states drew 
the lesson that cooperative compliance on their part would strengthen similar nationalist 
populists in their own countries.  
This picture may be somewhat too gloomy. The deal with Turkey has bought the EU time 
by reducing the pressure of new arrivals to Greece. And the mills of the EU Commission keep 
grinding slowly but persistently towards further Europeanization of asylum and refugee policies. 
But there is still no end in sight of the Syrian nightmare. And the death toll in the Mediterranean 
is rising. This is, after all, the strongest indicator that Europe has failed to live up to its potential 
when put to the test by the refugee crisis. 
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